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I. INTRODUCTION
"'"t" did it because I loved my son, all right?,' the father shouted toIreporters after he was arrested. 'I loved my son, all right? I love
my wife.'"1 These were the words spoken by 23-year-old Rudy
Linares, moments after he kept hospital staffers at bay with a .357-caliber
handgun while he tearfully removed his comatose son from life support
and let him die.2 This incident, along with numerous others, vividly illus-
trates the controversy and resulting debate over when medicine can
agonizingly postpone death rather than prolong and sustain life.
The sickness or loss of a loved one, though a common experience, is
never easy. The situation is particularly poignant and difficult when a
1. Brenda C. Coleman, Father's Removal of Baby from Life Support Renews Ethical
Questions, Assoc. Press, Apr. 27, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP file.
2. Id.
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child is involved. Medical treatment for minors is often the most difficult
of medical decision-making because "[flalling as they do somewhere be-
tween adult humans and animals in terms of their capacities, but normally
having from the moment of conception the potential to become adults,
children constitute a category of living things unlike any other from the
standpoint of the moral and conceptual problems that their treatment
raises."'3 Thus the task of deciding what limitations, if any, should be
placed on the rights of children's parents, health care providers, or gov-
ernment officials in making decisions about a child's health care is both
controversial and emotionally charged. Usually, all these interests con-
verge, and medical treatment is provided accordingly. It is when these
interests conflict, however, that complex legal and ethical issues arise, and
the answers to solve these issues are never clear and never simple.
4
One recent example serves to illustrate the complex issues that arise
when there are questions concerning what medical treatment is most ap-
propriate and in the best' interests of a sick child. This paradigmatic con-
troversy involved a struggle between a mother and a hospital over an
infant girl known as "Baby K." 5 Baby K was born with a congenital con-
dition known as anencephaly. Anencephaly is a defect in which the brain
stem is present but the cerebral cortex is rudimentary or absent. There is
no treatment that will cure, correct, or ameliorate this affliction. Since
most anencephalic infants die within days of their birth, hospital medical
personnel urged Ms. H, the baby's biological mother, to permit a "Do-
Not-Resuscitate Order" (DNR) for Baby K that would allow medical
personnel to discontinue any mechanical ventilator treatment.6 This deci-
sion was based on the fact that no treatment existed for Baby K's
anencephalic condition, "[b]ecause agressive treatment would serve no
therapeutic or palliative purpose" and "ventilator care was medically un-
necessary and inappropriate."'7
Despite this advice, Ms. H continued to request ventilator care for
Baby K. In response to Ms. H's request, the hospital consulted a three-
person ethics committee, composed of a family practitioner, a psychia-
trist, and a minister. The committee's recommendation to the hospital
was that the ventilator treatment should end because the care was "fu-
tile" and, if the mother refused to follow the advice, that the hospital
should seek guidance on how to resolve the conflict through the appropri-
3. Robert L. Holmes, Children and Health Care Decisionmaking: A Reply to Angela
Holder, in CHILDREN AND HEALTH CARE: MORAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 173, 173-79
(Loretta M. Kopelman & John C. Moskop eds., 1989).
4. Karen H. Rothenberg, Medical Decision Making for Children, in BioL~w § 8, at
149 (James F. Childress et al. eds., 1986).
5. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
6. It is a standard procedure in most hospitals that a patient be given Cardiopulmo-
nary Resuscitation (CPR) unless there is a written DNR order in the patient's chart. The
entry of a DNR order on a child's medical chart is a prohibition against heroic and ex-
traordinary efforts at resuscitation. See generally John M. Luce, Ethical Principles in Criti-
cal Care, 263 JAMA 696, 697 (1990).
7. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592-93.
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ate legal channels. When Ms. H subsequently rejected the committee's
recommendation, the hospital eventually moved to appoint a guardian ad
litem to represent the best interests of Baby K.
Both the guardian ad litem, and Mr. K, Baby K's biological father,
shared the hospital's position that ventilator treatment should be with-
held from Baby K. The hospital then instigated an action for declaratory
and injunctive relief in federal district court to allow it to refuse to pro-
vide the medical treatment that it deemed medically and ethically inap-
propriate. 8 The unresolved issue was whether or not the hospital should
be forced to provide, upon demand of the parents, medical treatment that
it determined to be futile and medically inappropriate.9 Furthermore, the
question remained whether Ms. H was really looking out for Baby K's
best interests, or whether a court-appointed guardian was a more objec-
tive proponent of Baby K's interests.
This story, and others like it,1° presents the highly controverted issue of
who ultimately makes the decisions for a severely ill infant or child. In
such cases, medical personnel have come to the difficult decision that ag-
gressive medical treatment for an infant or child is futile. The provision
of care is characterized as medically, and in some instances ethically, in-
appropriate for the patient, yet a family member disagrees and continues
to request the disputed treatment.
At this point the legal system is often called upon to resolve the contro-
versy. The debate flourishes around the following questions: whether
there is a point at which certain medical treatments are to be considered
futile and whether standards can be articulated to determine such a point;
whether federal laws permit courts to order health care personnel to pro-
vide medical care believed to be inappropriate and futile; whether the
statutes implicated in such situations were intended to interfere with a
physician's medical judgment or ethical responsibilities; and finally, who
is best able to make decisions regarding what treatment would be in the
best interests of the child involved.
This comment addresses these questions. Part II explores the various
models for conceptualizing the idea of futility and proposes a framework
for a discussion of these decisions. Part III analyzes the applicable fed-
eral law that influences judicial decision-making in this area. Part IV dis-
cusses the struggle between the various decision-makers and the ethical
and moral issues implicated by decisions of this sort. Part V concludes
that medical professionals should ordinarily defer to the wishes of the
parents in treatment decisions for minors; however, they should not be
ordered by courts to provide medical care generally acknowledged by the
8. Id at 593.
9. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text for a discussion on the resolution of
the case by the Fourth Circuit, and its narrow holding based on an application of the Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Labor Act.
10. See, e.g., John J. Paris et al., Physician's Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case
of Baby L, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1012 (1990); In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992).
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medical profession to be futile and medically, as well as ethically,
unsound.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR FUTILITY DECISIONS
Futility is the term used when physicians seek to limit the lengths to
which they must go to sustain the lives of patients, children or adults, who
have lost the ability for conscious, interactive, and meaningful function-
ing." Thus, decisions regarding futility are steeped in moral and social
dilemmas. The case of Baby K exemplifies the competing interests be-
tween the physician and the parents that form the bases of the contro-
versy. It is certainly troubling to consider foregoing life-sustaining
treatment for a severely ill child or adolescent. Society views young peo-
ple as vulnerable and in need of protection from the harsh realities of life.
In such situations, ending the life of children before it barely has begun
seems tragic, unfair, and unnatural to the adults who must participate in
this kind of decision-making.
The case of Baby K also reflects the ability of medical technology to
prolong life in the absence of obvious benefit to seriously ill patients.
While case law and living wills enunciate the right of the competent adult
to make decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment,' 2 these lines be-
come blurred when dealing with minors because of the need for surrogate
decision-makers to act in the best interests of the child. Whoever the
decision-maker may be, a general overview of futility is needed to under-
stand the framework from which these difficult medical decisions are
made.
A. FUTILITY DEFINED
Futility is not easily defined. One medical ethicist commenting on a
futility case in the adult decision-making context described it as "care that
does not accomplish its immediate purpose.' 3 Many other commenta-
tors have suggested that treatment is medically futile whenever physi-
cians, patients, or surrogate decision-makers deem that medical
intervention (1) is useless or ineffective;' 4 (2) fails to offer a minimum
11. Allan S. Brett & Laurence B. McCullough, When Patients Request Specific Inter-
vention: Defining Limits of the Physician's Obligation, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1347, 1347-
51 (1986).
12. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990). Choice in
Dying, successor to the Society for the Right to Die, regularly updates a compendium of
refusal of treatment legislation through its subscription service. This compendium contains
over 70 statutes consisting of state legislation pertaining to advance directives, durable
powers of attorney, and surrogate health care decision-making. Telephone Interview with
a representative of Choice in Dying (Oct. 15, 1993).
13. Lisa Belkin, As Family Protests, Hospital Seeks an End to Woman's Life Support,
N.Y. TiMFS, Jan. 10, 1991, at Al, A16 (quoting Susan M. Wolf from the Hastings Center in
Briarcliff, N.Y.).
14. Adrienne Asch et al., Who Decides?, 17 HASTINGS CENMR REP. 17, 17-21 (1988);
Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Roger G. Spragg, Ethical Decisions in Discontinuing
Mechanical Ventilation, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 984, 988 (1988); Stuart J. Youngner, Who
Defines Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094, 2095 (1988).
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quality of life or modicum of medical benefit; 15 (3) cannot possibly
achieve the patient's goals;16 or (4) does not offer a reasonable chance of
survival. 17 At the very least, there is a point at which further treatment is
medically useless. It is at this point that further treatment also becomes
ethically problematic, and health care professionals ought not be coerced
to provide treatment when such treatment affronts their sense of ethics.' 8
This point in the abstract has been described as a treatment that "merely
preserves permanent unconsciousness or cannot end dependence on in-
tensive medical care."'
19
One obstacle that must be overcome is a determination of the type of
action that should be taken once a physician determines that a treatment
is futile. One suggestion has been to propose a policy that "would enable
health care providers to make ethical but unilateral decisions regarding
CPR [when CPR is deemed a futile treatment]. '20 The argument is that,
by acting unilaterally, "physicians would avoid causing unnecessary suf-
fering for the patient, as well as an unfair burden of guilt for the fam-
ily."'21 Moreover, treatment decisions made by the family may be based
on factors (e.g., fear of death or losing a loved one, or guilt over not
visiting patients) that have little to do with what the patient desires or
what is in the patient's best interest.22 The problem, however, with this
argument is that it whittles away at patient autonomy, whether the deci-
sion is being made by a patient himself or through a surrogate decision-
maker. It does this in favor of an exercise of strong paternalism on the
part of the physician.23 The idea of unilateral futility decisions also places
an emphasis on the broader social issue of proper allocation of our na-
tion's resources.24 This idea implicitly assumes that society has an inter-
est in limiting futile interventions in order to divert limited resources to
more productive use within, or even outside, the health care system. 25
Futility has also been defined in terms of statistical probabilities such
that "[a] given intervention could be judged futile if the chance of achiev-
15. Brett & McCullough, supra note 11, at 1347-51; Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody,
Ethics and Communications in Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 43, 43-
46 (1988); Joseph Lantos et al., Survival After Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in Babies of
Very Low Birth Weight: Is CPR Futile?, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 91, 91-95 (1988).
16. H. S. Perkins, Ethics at the End of Life: Practical Principles for Making Resuscita-
tion Decisions, 1 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 170, 170-76 (1986).
17. George E. Taffet et al., In-hospital Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 260 JAMA
2069, 2069-72 (1988) (cited in Nancy S. Jecker and Robert S. Pearlman, Medical Futility;
Who Decides?, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1140, 1144 n.15 (1992)).
18. Erich H. Loewy et al., Futility and Its Wider Implications: A Concept in Need of
Further Examination, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 429, 429-31 (1993).
19. Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Nancy Jecker, Futility in Practice, 153 ARCHIVES IN-
TERNAL MED. 437, 437 (1993).
20. Donald J. Murphy, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: Time For a Reappraisal of Long
Term Care Institutions, 260 JAMA 2098, 2098-2101 (1988).
21. See Youngner, supra note 14, at 2094.
22. Id




ing one or more of the goals [determined by the physician and the pa-
tient] is not entirely absent, but is highly unlikely."'26 But exactly how low
the probability of success must be is a question whose answer has not
been agreed upon. Statistics are often used as a way to define the outer
bounds of futility.27 Whether or not a one-percent chance of success or
even a five-percent chance of success is low enough to be characterized as
futile treatment is highly debatable. 28 Certainly, considerations such as
the probability of recovery, quality of life, ameliorative effects of treat-
ment, and statistical probability of success are all taken into account, but
the question of how much weight each factor is given remains open. In
other words, "[w]hen is an outside chance a chance worth taking?" 29
Additionally, the definition of the desired goal effectively determines
the outcome: "[f]or one patient, a life with extreme disability and pain
might be quite tolerable; for another, it might be totally unacceptable."1
3 0
As another example, if the goal of a medical treatment is to "accomplish
an immediate purpose,"' l then keeping a patient such as Baby K on a
ventilator meets the goal (i.e., the ventilator keeps the patient breathing).
On the other hand, if the goal is that the treatment must offer a reason-
able chance of survival,32 then the ventilator treatment is futile since
anencephaly entails no real prospect of successful treatment and no rea-
sonable chance of survival.
Still, there is one more important factor that reveals itself: the human
factor. Even when a course of treatment is deemed futile, living for five
more days might give some patients the opportunity to say good-byes, to
wait for a loved one to arrive from another city, or simply to come to
terms with the grief of losing a loved one.33 In this instance, otherwise
futile treatment may become a way to achieve reasonable and desirable
goals.3 4
All in all, the completely unilateral plan of leaving the decision solely
in the hands of the physician is a regressive step.35 This is so because,
"under the guise of medical expertise and concern for proper resource
allocation, it encourages physicians to substitute their own value judg-
ments for those of their patients."'3 6 In a sense, it urges physicians to cut
off communication with patients and families regarding the futility of
treatment. This intervention is complex, symbolistic, and unwelcome.
Despite the importance of patient autonomy, and the importance of






31. See Belkin, supra note 13.
32. See Taffet, supra note 17.
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decision-making process, the question still remains as to how far this right
of participation extends.37 The right of the patient directly confficts with
the ethical and medical obligations of the physician who feels that he is
not obliged to provide medically inappropriate treatment. Ideally, a bal-
ance should be struck between the patient's interest in autonomy and the
medical profession's interest in avoiding medically futile treatment.
B. ANOTHER WAY OF CONCEPTUALIZING FUTILITY
The issue is really whether the concept of futility should always be un-
dervalued in favor of the idea of patient autonomy. The answer is: not
necessarily. Perhaps this problem can partially be solved by developing a
rigorous definition of futility, so as to encourage clarity of thinking with
regard to the larger ethical problem of withholding or withdrawing medi-
cal treatment.38
Moreover, the resistance to the notion of futility may be derived from
the fear that futility will masquerade for less defensible motivations:
[W]ill its acceptance revive discarded abuses of medical paternalism?
Will it reverse recent advances in patient autonomy and shared deci-
sion making? Will the power to declare treatment futile provide a
convenient excuse for physicians to neglect patients they deem un-
worthy? Will it entice nervous health care providers to avoid pa-
tients with life-threatening contagious illnesses? Will futility serve as
a devious rationale for reducing medical costs? 3 9
All of these concerns are valid, and perhaps a clearer understanding of
the concept will properly serve to safeguard the true notion of futility
from these potential corruptions.40
37. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Ethics, 270 JAMA 202, 202 (1993). The basic right of par-
ticipation was first asserted as a patients's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. See In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). This was extended to include the right of surrogates for
incompetent patients to refuse life-support measures even if a physician deemed them
medically necessary and ethically appropriate. The cases and scenarios considered here, In
re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); Baby L (discussed in
Paris et al., supra note 10); and In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992), are the mirror
images of the first "right to die" cases. In such cases, the physician determines that medical
treatment is medically inappropriate or futile, and the patient/surrogate insists on treat-
ment. They differ from the "right to die" cases in which the physician determines medical
treatment is appropriate and the patient/surrogate insists on non-treatment. Ironically, the
awareness of the futility of a treatment might be used to support the rationality of a pa-
tient's autonomous refusal of treatment, with all the weight being given to the autonomy
based on a rationalization of futility.
38. Schneiderman & Jecker, supra note 19, at 437-41. The authors suggest that the
notion most often confused with futility is that of rationing. The former implies no appar-
ent therapeutic benefit, while the latter acknowledges therapeutic benefit but raises ques-
tions about cost-worthiness. This confusion serves only to complicate and devalue the
positive aspects of dealing with futility in a rational and reasonable method.
39. Id. at 437.
40. Id. An analogy can be drawn to the period of uncertainty inherent in the defini-
tion of brain death. After considerable debate and expert testimony within the medical,
philosophical, and legal communities, the Uniform Brain Death Act was adopted in most
states. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH (1981);
Guidelines for the Determination of Death, 246 JAMA 2184, 2184-86 (1981) (Report of the
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One approach to a better definition or clearer standard takes into ac-
count the historical and traditional goal of medical treatment, which is to
achieve a benefit above a minimal quantitative or qualitative threshold.4 1
The quantitative threshold of futility focuses on the probability that a par-
ticular outcome can be achieved and involves a judgment that this
probability falls below a threshold considered minimal.42 For example, if
in the last 100 cases a certain treatment has been used and has failed, the
requirement of falling below the quantitative threshold could be consid-
ered met.43 Authority to render a judgment about quantitative futility
rests squarely with the physician. 4 In order to determine the minimal
threshold, "[a] decision about how to define futility should be made by a
broad consensus among health professionals and others. '45 Thus, once a
community-based standard is in place, physicians can be responsible for
determining whether their patients meet the pre-determined conditions.4
Such pre-determinations are not properly based on vague clinical impres-
sions, but on statistical information regarding the outcomes of specific
interventions for the different categories of patients.47 While these types
of value judgments are never purely technical exercises because they are
uncertain and open-ended, these judgments are inherent in medical
choices and are integral to the role of the physician.
The second threshold of futility as determined by Schneiderman and
Jecker is the qualitative threshold. Who decides whether the quality of
life associated with a particular medical treatment is futile? This can be a
balance of two perspectives. One view is that even where the potential
quality of life is extremely poor, only patients or their appropriate surro-
gates should be able to authorize the withholding or withdrawal of medi-
cal treatment.48 The alternative viewpoint is that there is a position
somewhere along the continuum at which the quality of life associated
with such an intervention becomes so poor that the decision to withhold
or withdraw treatment should no longer rest with the patient or surro-
gate.49 It becomes, instead, the physician's prerogative. 50 A fair resolu-
tion of these two views may be achieved by negotiating a compromise
that both physicians and patients can accept. Going through such a pro-
Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis of Death to the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Behavioral Research).
41. Schneiderman & Jecker, supra note 19, at 437.
42. Nancy S. Jecker & Robert A. Pearlman, Medical Futility; Who Decides?, 152
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1140, 1141-44 (1992).
43. Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implica-
tions, 112 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 949, 954-59 (1990).
44. Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 42, at 1140.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. George E. Taffet et al., In-hospital Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 260 JAMA
2069, 2069-72 (1988).
48. John D. Lantos et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, AM. J. MED. 81,
83 (1989).
49. Kathy Faber-Langendoen, Resuscitation of Patients with Metastic Cancer: Is Tran-
sient Benefit Still Futile?, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 235, 237 (1991).
50. Id.
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cess in hopes of a resolution necessarily requires acknowledging commu-
nity values and goals, as well as sharing a broad consensus of opinion that
reflects these values.5 ' These rights should be determined by a process
that takes into account our societal views of what is proper or necessary
to protect a patient's best interests.52
Therefore, an appropriate method of achieving this goal suggests that
therapeutic futility be evolved within the present context of "standards of
care." Just as empirical studies are always gathering data about treat-
ments that provide significant clinical benefits, so too should attention be
paid to treatments that demonstratively do not provide such benefits.53
Standards of care, therefore, can refer not only to the employment of
useful treatments but also to the withholding of useless treatment. 54
"Since such standards of care serve as guidelines to the court, physicians
who decline to use futile treatments, even in the face of demands from
patients and families, will be able to make those decisions with ethical
and legal support.155
III. FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
An initial understanding of how medicine and law conceptualize futility
is required for a discussion of the federal laws implicated when a conflict
between parent and health care provider is brought before a court for
resolution. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973,56 the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act of 1990,57 the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984,58 and the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 59 can all logically
be implicated and discussed in the struggle for autonomy between a phy-
sician and parent.
A. THE REHABILITATION Acr OF 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 197360 was the federal response to disputes
between parents and the state for resolution of conflicts involving the
appropriate medical treatment given to minor children.61 Section 504 of
51. Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 42, at 1142.
52. Id
53. Drummond Rennie & Annette Flanagin, Publication Bias: The Triumph of Hope
Over Experience, 267 JAMA 411, 412 (1992).
54. Schneiderman & Jecker, supra note 19, at 438.
55. Id.
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
60. 29 U.S.C §§ 701-797.
61. See Bill Lawton et al., Governmental Action Regarding the Treatment of Seriously
Ill Newborns, 11 J.C. & U.L. 405 (1985). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was, however,
ultimately unsuccessful in its attempt to limit a parent's right to withhold or withdraw nec-
essary medical treatment, including nutrition, to severely handicapped infants through pro-
mulgation of the Baby Doe Regulations. In Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610
(1986), the Supreme Court invalidated the "Baby Doe" regulations largely because the
regulations were beyond the scope of the statute. The Court held that "nothing in [§ 504 of
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the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against an "other-
wise qualified" handicapped individual solely by reason of his or her
handicap, under any program receiving federal financial assistance.62 The
statute provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps... shall, solely by
reason of his or her handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ... .63
The courts have devised a four-part test for determining whether Section
504 has been violated:
[T]o state a claim under Section 504, a plaintiff must prove (1) that
he is a 'handicapped individual' under the Act, (2) that he is 'other-
wise qualified' for the [benefit] sought, (3) that he was [discriminated
against] solely by reason of his handicap, and (4) that the program or
activity receives federal financial assistance.64
The issue is whether a hospital violates the Rehabilitation Act by refus-
ing to provide an infant or child with the treatment requested by the par-
ents. Looking to the plain wording of the statute, nothing suggests that
Congress intended to interfere with a physician's ability to make medi-
cally appropriate decisions in individual cases. Rather, the Act only guar-
antees that the disabled will have "meaningful access" to employment,
housing, health care, and other services. 65
Moreover, nothing in the legislative history of Section 504 suggests that
Congress intended to authorize federal interference with a physician's
medical judgment. To the contrary, the legislative history, as well as the
statute's initial definition of "handicapped individual," indicates that
Congress was truly concerned with discrimination against disabled indi-
viduals in the employment context.66 Although subsequent amendments
clarified that Section 504 requires meaningful, non-discriminatory access
for the disabled in other areas, including health care, nothing in the legis-
lative history of its subsequent amendments indicates congressional in-
the Rehabilitation Act] authorizes [the Secretary of Health and Human Services] to com-
mandeer state agencies to force compliance [with the "Baby Doe" regulations] by other
recipients of federal funds (in this instance, hospitals)." Id. at 642. However, the opinion
only ruled on the four Baby Doe Rules and failed to address the larger question of the role
of the federal government in the treatment decisions of seriously ill infants and minors.
See id. at 624. The four invalidated provisions required: (1) health care providers receiving
federal funds to post notices advising that, under § 504, health care cannot legally be with-
held from infants on the basis of mental or physical impairments; (2) state child protective
services agencies to establish procedures to prevent unlawful medical neglect of handi-
capped infants; (3) immediate access to patient records; and (4) expedited compliance ac-
tions. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.55(b)-(e) (1985).
62. Codified at 29 U.S.C § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
63. Id. § 794(a).
64. Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1499 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation
omitted), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 1255 (1993).
65. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 624 (1986).
66. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REc. 24,587 (July 18, 1973) (remarks of Senator Taft on S.
Rep. No. 93-318, 93d Cong, 1st Sess. 18-19 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076,
2092); see also United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 157-58 (2d Cir. 1984).
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tention to override individual treatment decisions of physicians.
Arguably, to the extent that Congress included health care within the am-
bit of Section 504, it did so only in the sense of requiring providers to
make health services equally available to all persons who are able to meet
a particular program's requirements in spite of their disability. This is a
far different situation from the intrusion into individual medical decisions
that would result if the statute were violated by a hospital's refusal to
provide aggressive treatment requested by a parent that conflicts with the
treatment determined by the hospital to be medically appropriate.
Moreover, several judicial decisions have addressed the issue of
whether or not Section 504 applies to individual medical treatment deci-
sions for handicapped minors. In American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Heckler,67 the court noted that the "legislative history [of Section 504]
focuses on discrimination against adults and older children, and denial of
access to federal programs. '68 The court also found that "no congres-
sional committee or member of the House or Senate ever even suggested
that section 504 would be used to monitor medical treatment of newborn
infants or establish standards for preserving a particular quality of life."
69
Similarly, two circuits that have addressed this issue have both held
that infants with birth defects are not "otherwise qualified" within the
meaning of Section 504, when the handicapping condition is related to
the condition to be treated.70 In University Hospital, the court exhaus-
tively analyzed the full legislative record of Section 504, including post-
enactment Congressional hearings. It then concluded that Congress'
"overriding concern" was with guaranteeing disabled individuals access
to programs receiving federal assistance and that the legislative history
contained no statements that suggested a broader application of the stat-
ute to individual medical decisions.71
Additionally, the Second Circuit ruled that Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act could not be meaningfully applied to medical treatment deci-
sions involving newborn infants with birth defects. 72 The court reasoned,
in part, that the term "otherwise qualified" cannot be applied in the
"fluid context" of medical treatment decisions without distorting the Re-
habilitation Act's plain meaning. 73 The court observed that where the
handicapping condition is related to the condition to be treated, it will
rarely, if ever, be possible to say that a particular medical decision is dis-
criminatory. 74 Moreover, the court determined that the legislative his-
67. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed, No. 83-1407 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 4,
1983).
68. Id. at 401.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y, 729 F.2d 144, 156-57 (2d
Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1255 (1993).
71. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 157-60.
72. Id.
73: Ida at 156.
74. Id. at 157.
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tory of the statute demonstrated that Congress "never contemplated that
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act would apply to treatment decisions
involving defective infants or young children when the statute was en-
acted in 1973, when it was amended in 1974, or at any subsequent time."75
More recently, the Tenth Circuit in Johnson observed that the "other-
wise qualified" language poses a formidable obstacle for anyone alleging
discrimination in violation of Section 504 based upon the failure to re-
ceive medical treatments for birth defects.76 In Johnson, the court was
asked to determine whether the district court had properly dismissed a
Section 504 complaint of discriminatory medical treatment relating to a
study of sixty-nine infants with varying degrees of spina bifida, a congeni-
tal defect that leaves "the spinal cord and membranes that envelop it
exposed." 77
In affirming the dismissal of the Section 504 claim, the court adopted
the analysis of the Second Circuit in University Hospital.78 The court ob-
served that in the case of severely ill infants, if the infant were not so
physically handicapped, "he or she would not need the medical treatment
and thus would not 'otherwise qualify' for the treatment.' 79 This line of
authority obviously must be utilized on a case-by-case basis, whether the
infant or child has severe birth defects, is irreversibly comatose, etc.
The counter-argument to this line of reasoning analogizes birth defects
and other severe illnesses to racial discrimination. This theory reasons
that, if the infant or child had some other medical condition along with,
for example, pulmonary distress, the patient would receive the ventilation
treatment. 80 Thus, the sole reason for withholding the ventilator treat-
ment from the minor is the medical condition, demonstrating accordingly
that the minor is "otherwise qualified" for the ventilator treatment and
that the patient is being discriminated against on the basis of his or her
handicap.81
The problem with this reasoning is that treatment decisions properly
relate to the condition being treated. In deciding how to respond to any
clinical situation, physicians correctly consider the risks, benefits, and
costs of treatment modalities. For example, in Glanz v. Vernick,82 the
plaintiff was refused ear surgery because he had AIDS. The plaintiff sur-
vived a summary judgment motion under Section 504 because the refusal
to treat might have been based on the handicapping condition (AIDS),
and accordingly might not have been a bona fide medical judgment.83
75. Id. at 161.
76. Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1493.
77. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 146.
78. Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1493.
79. Id.
80. See Judge Winter's dissent in University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 162.
81. See, e.g, In re Baby K, 832 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding that, but for Baby
K's anencephaly, ventilator treatment would be available, and holding the hospital liable
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
82. 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1990).
83. Id at 638.
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Similarly, a refusal to provide aggressive care to a severely ill child based
upon race would not be a bona fide medical judgment.84 However, this
analogy to race, when the treatment decision is closely related to the con-
ditions being treated, as in the case of Baby K, is inapposite.
More specifically, if this interpretation of Section 504 were to prevail,
no medical decision to withhold or terminate an available treatment
would ever be permissible.85 Considerations of cost, relative benefit, or
even futility-based on accumulated scientific and clinical knowledge
about the patient's condition-could no longer be taken into account.
86
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, under this reading of Section 504,
patients who are sick must be treated as if they were not sick, and pa-
tients who are dying must be treated as if they were not dying. Thus, the
conclusion is that Section 504 does not in any way mandate a hospital to
provide the medically futile treatment, even in the face of the parent's
demands.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits public accom-
modations from discriminating against individuals with disabilities.87 A
"public accommodation" includes any "professional office of a health
care provider, hospital, or other service establishment. '88 Thus, a hospi-
tal providing medical services to severely ill infants or children is a public
accommodation for the purposes of the ADA.
Section 302(a) of the ADA sets forth a general rule of nondiscrimina-
tion against the disabled:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of a disa-
bility in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public ac-
84. See University Hosp., 729 F.2d. at 162 (Winter, J., dissenting) ("A judgment not to
perform surgery ... because a person is black is not a bona fide medical judgment.").
85. In this regard, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services bases its guide-
lines relating to health care for handicapped infants on legitimate medical considerations.
See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. C (1994).
86. Any decision to hold a hospital liable under the Rehabilitation Act when con-
fronted with demands made by parents for what is believed to be medically futile treat-
ment would ignore the guidelines published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, written to assist the interpretation of Section 504 relating to health care for handi-
capped infants. For example, the guidelines clearly state that the withholding of medical
treatment from an anencephalic infant does not violate Section 504: "Withholding of med-
ical treatment for an infant born with anencephaly, who will inevitably die within a short
period of time, would not constitute a discriminatory act because the treatment would be
futile and do no more than temporarily prolong the act of dying." 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. C
(1994). Again, the presence or absence of parental consent does not enter into the analy-
sis. In either case it is the action or inaction of the hospital and its doctors that may or may
not implicate Section 504.
87. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 302, 104 Stat. 355
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182).
88. Id. § 301, 104 Stat. 353 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)).
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commodation by any persons who owns, leases (or leases to), or op-
erates a place of public accommodation. 89
Furthermore, section 302 of the ADA sets forth specific prohibitions
against discrimination.9° Of particular relevance here is that "[i]t shall be
discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals on the basis
of a disability ... to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class
to participate in or benefit from the goods, services,... or accommoda-
tions of an entity." 91 The argument in favor of liability is that the "plain
language" of the ADA does not permit the discontinuance of services to
an infant or minor when life-saving services would otherwise be provided
or continued.
The flaw in this argument is concordant with the arguments in favor of
liability under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Treatment
decisions properly relate to the nature of the condition being treated. In
deciding how to respond to a specific clinical situation, physicians con-
sider the likely risks and benefits of different courses of action. A con-
struction of the ADA that displaces bona fide medical decision-making
altogether is at war with clinical medicine.
For a number of reasons the ADA is no more applicable than the Re-
habilitation Act. First, the two statutes are similar in purpose-both are
designed to prohibit certain entities from discriminating on the basis of a
disability, most notably with respect to access to programs, services, and
places. 92 Second, the definition of "disability" is identical in both laws.93
Third, the two statutes cross-reference one another, including an express
statement by the ADA that its standards shall be at least as strict as those
applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act (the title containing Sec-
tion 504). 94
Fourth, like the Rehabilitation Act, nothing in the language of the
ADA or its legislative history suggests that the statute was intended to
interfere with the reasonable medical judgments of treating physicians.
To the contrary, the ADA prohibits the application of eligibility criteria
that tend to screen out any class of individuals with disabilities "unless
such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods,
services, [and] facilities." 95 When it is necessary to draw a distinction
based on the disability because the distinction is critical to the service
given, as in the case involving the provision of futile treatment, such dis-
tinctions are allowed.
89. Id. § 302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
90. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)).
91. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)).
92. See, e.g., Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Neb. 1993) (treating the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act essentially identically with respect to rights and remedies,
but noting that the ADA is not limited to programs that receive financial assistance).
93. Americans with Disabilities Act § 3, 104 Stat 329 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
94. Americans with Disabilities Act § 501, 104 Stat. 369 (codified at 42 U.S.C
§ 12201(a)); 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
95. Americans with Disabilities Act § 302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)).
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Moreover, the legislative history of the ADA clarifies that a patient's
disabilities may be considered when relevant to medical decision-making.
A committee report of the House of Representatives states that
"[n]othing in this legislation is intended to prohibit a physician from pro-
viding the most appropriate medical treatment in the physician's judg-
ment .... -"96 This statement could not be more clear. In cases involving
treatment characterized as futile, the physician's best judgment is that a
particular treatment will have no therapeutic or palliative benefit. There-
fore, the ADA should not be used to force such treatment.
The legislative history illustrates the main premise underlying the anal-
ysis. Congress noted that a physician who specializes in burn patients
could not refuse to treat the burns of a deaf person because of the deaf-
ness.97 This is so because a person's hearing status is unrelated to his or
her bum conditions. On the other hand, Congress did not state that phy-
sicians are prohibited from providing different types of treatment where a
patient's disability is directly related to, or intertwined with, the medical
condition being treated. As discussed above, judicial decisions have re-
jected a broad construction of the Rehabilitation Act and "the ADA ex-
pressly contemplates that the voluminous precedent arising out of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act may serve as guidance for determinations
involving the ADA."98 In short, a reasonable construction of the ADA is
to permit physicians to make treatment decisions based on their best
medical judgments, particularly when a consideration of the disability is
necessary due to its proximity to the acute medical condition.
C. THE CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984
Congress responded to the challenges to the Baby Doe regulations99 by
enacting amendments to the Child Abuse and Treatment Act.1°° These
amendments specifically addressed the issue of withholding medically in-
dicated treatment (including appropriate nutrition) from disabled infants
and children with life-threatening conditions. 1 1 In contrast to the Reha-
bilitation Act and the ADA, the Child Abuse Amendments do not create
a federal cause of action, but rather employ a grant program to build on
existing state mechanisms for dealing with child abuse and neglect. 10 2
96. SENATE COMMITFEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, THE AMERICAN WITH
DIsABILrrIEs ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAW 101-336 (ADA), at 161 (1991) (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 160.
98. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. Il. 1993).
99. See supra note 61.
100. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,887 (1985) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
101. Id
102. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-1 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(A)
(1989); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-701(g) (1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 273, § 1 (Law.
Co-op. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-5(1)(i) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-c:3(b)
& (c) (1994); N.J. REV. STAT § 9:6-8.9(d) (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(c)(3) (Law.
Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-6(4) (1992); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
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The amendments confirm the primary role of the states in the area of
child protection. The continued qualification by states for certain federal
grants is conditioned upon development and implementation of certain
new procedures to respond to reports of medical neglect, including but
not limited to the withholding of medically indicated treatments. 10 3 To
receive a grant for its child protection service ("CPS") system, a state
must establish procedures for: (1) coordination and consultation with des-
ignated individuals; (2) prompt notification of cases of suspected medical
neglect, including instances of withholding medically indicated treatment
from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions; and (3) legal reme-
dies, under state law, for the CPS agency to prevent the withholding of
medically indicated treatment.1' 4 The federal role is limited to (1) estab-
lishing a clearinghouse for information regarding developments in treat-
ment and support services for disabled infants, and (2) promulgating
regulations to ensure that states fulfill their obligations under the stat-
ute.l0 5 Ostensibly, there is no authority for a court to interfere with the
medical judgment of the hospital and its physicians under the Child
Abuse Amendments. At most, the amendments authorize a state agency
to examine the hospital's decision and file suit in state court on its own
behalf.
Procedural and jurisdictional questions aside, the issue is whether or
not the actions taken by a hospital and its physicians in refusing to offer
medically futile treatment constitute "abuse" or "neglect" under the
Child Abuse Amendments. The Amendments define "medical neglect"
to include the "withholding of medically indicated treatment from dis-
abled minors with life-threatening conditions."'1 6 "Withholding medical
treatment" is in turn defined to mean "the failure to respond to the [mi-
nor's] life-threatening conditions by providing treatment.., which, in the
treating physician's reasonable medical judgment, will most likely to be
effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions... ,"107 When
care is believed to be futile and ineffective in ameliorating or correcting
the child's condition, then the behavior of the hospital and the physicians
should not fall within the ambit of the statute's definition of "withholding
treatment" or "medical neglect."
Moreover, the statute explicitly excludes from its definition of neglect
the failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydra-
§9 12.04(3), 34.01 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(3)(c) (1991);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020, 26.44.020(3) & (12) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1)(d) (West Supp. 1994).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
104. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5104, 5105 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). As noted by Senator Hatch, a
principal sponsor of the 1984 amendments, the "legislation does not authorize direct fed-
eral involvement in individual cases." 130 CONG. REc. 27783 (1984) (letter from Sen.
Hatch to Sen. Weicker).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10).
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tion, or medication) when, in the treating physician's reasonable medical
judgment:
(A) the child is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) the provision of such treatment would (i) merely prolong dy-
ing; (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the child's
life-threatening conditions; or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of sur-
vival of the infant; or
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such
circumstances would be inhumane.' 08
The statute is clear that any one of the above elements will take the case
out of the realm of medical neglect.
In sum, as was the case with the other federal statutes, the Child Abuse
Amendments do not authorize the federal courts to intervene in individ-
ual medical decisions. Moreover, even if such intervention were author-
ized by the statute, failure to provide life-prolonging treatment in cases of
futility would not constitute medical neglect under the definitions con-
tained in the act.
The argument in favor of obtaining relief under the Amendments is
that the physician's judgment cannot displace the parent's judgment. The
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has stated that the
parents have authority under the Child Abuse Amendments to make
treatment decisions for the child:
The decision to provide or withhold medically indicated treatment is,
except in highly unusual circumstances, made by the parents or legal
guardian .... This is the parents' right and responsibility .... The
parents' role as decision maker must be respected and supported un-
less they choose a course of action inconsistent with applicable stan-
dards established by law.10 9
A parent's medical treatment decision would be inconsistent with the law
only if it constituted child abuse or neglect, which was the harm sought to
be prevented by this statute.
This assertion by DHHS is inconsistent with the fact that DHHS itself
has recognized that deference to parental decisions applies only to deci-
sions to "provide or withhold medically indicated treatment."" 0 When
there is no treatment that will cure, correct, or ameliorate the illness, as in
cases where treatment is considered futile, then the only issue is whether
or not the requested treatment is "medically indicated." When the stan-
dard of care for treating various illnesses in the United States is to pro-
vide only supportive care, and not to provide aggressive care, including
ventilation, then that should be the only treatment "medically indicated."
108. Id
109. 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340 (1985).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
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D. THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND LABOR Acr
In enacting the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EM-
TALA), 111 Congress sought to address the growing problem of private
hospitals inappropriately refusing to provide emergency care to indigent
or uninsured patients. 112 Consequently, EMTALA requires that all hos-
pitals, as a condition to participating in Medicare, provide (1) "an appro-
priate medical screening examination" for patients at the emergency
department to determine whether they have an "emergency medical con-
dition;" and (2) "necessary stabilizing treatment" for individuals in such
an emergency state. 113 An "emergency medical condition" is defined in
the statute as "[a]cute symptoms of sufficient severity ... such that the
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to
result in ... serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunc-
tion of any bodily organ or part. 11 4 A "stabilizing" medical treatment is
defined as "such medical treatment of the condition ... necessary to as-
sure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deteriora-
tion of the condition" will result." 5
In cases such as Baby K,116 where continued treatment is determined
to be futile, the emergency situation involves mechanical ventilation. For
example, a child or infant may be brought to the emergency room suffer-
ing from respiratory distress; perhaps, the hospital staff is asking for a
Do-Not-Resuscitate Order. When such instances arise, the hospital must
look at the situation presented to determine whether it falls within the
plain language of the statute. Arguably, respiratory distress would consti-
tute an "emergency medical condition" under the statute.117 In addition,
EMTALA's legislative history includes a position paper by the American
College of Emergency Physicians stating that "stabilization" should in-
clude "[e]stablishing and assuring an adequate airway and adequate
ventilation.""18
The "plain language" argument is susceptible, however, to a variety of
alternative constructions that are compatible with a proper understanding
of the Congressional purpose and intent of protecting indigent patients in
need of emergency care."19 A child's ongoing treatment may not trigger
any EMTALA duties at all. The infant or child is a patient whose condi-
tion is well known to the hospital. Because the relationship with the hos-
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
112. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. 3, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 726; 131 CONG. REC. H9503 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1985); H.R. REP. No.
241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 744-45.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(a),(b).
114. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A).
115. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).
116. See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994), discussed
at supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
118. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 26, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 726.
119. See, e.g., Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993).
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pital is ongoing and the problems are previously anticipated, the child or
infant cannot be said to be an individual who comes to the hospital for
whom a determination of her condition must be made. 120 When the mi-
nor's treatment involves the continuing treatment of a patient already
under the hospital's care, EMTALA should not be implicated.
Moreover, while the plain language construction focuses on the duty to
stabilize, the term "stabilize" is inherently ambiguous. 121 EMTALA's
own definition of the term asks whether treatment and release is "reason-
able under the circumstances.' 22 To the extent that there is a duty under
EMTALA to stabilize in cases where such treatment is characterized as
futile and inappropriate, the nature and scope of that duty must be con-
strued in light of what is reasonable under the circumstances. If what is
reasonable is to provide only supportive care, and this reasonableness de-
termination is consistent with the standard of care, then the hospital
should not be under any additional duty according to EMTALA.
In contrast, one may argue that by denying these minors needed emer-
gency medical care requested by the minor's parents, a court would be
carving out a futility exception in EMTALA that does not exist and was
never contemplated by the framers of the legislation. The statute's pur-
pose is to "provide an adequate first response to a medical crisis for all
patients and send a clear signal to the hospital ... community that all
Americans, regardless of wealth or status, should know that a hospital
will provide what services it can when they are truly in physical dis-
tress.' 23 Applied to the respiratory distress example, a child's respira-
tory distress would constitute a medical crisis and ventilation would
provide an adequate response.
Upon closer examination, however, the EMTALA has a limited legisla-
tive purpose-to avoid patient dumping and to prevent disparate care,
which is defined as inconsistent applications of a hospital's own standard
of care. 124 This reading necessitates that, in order to achieve the purposes
of the Act, EMTALA accept the standard of care that is within the hospi-
tal's capabilities and is applied generally by the hospital.125 Thus, both
the standard of care within the hospital and within the profession must be
recognized and applied in any determination of liability under EM-
TALA.126 Because EMTALA itself does not establish the standard of
care, the standard of care is governed by what a reasonably prudent prac-
titioner would do under similar circumstances.
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1).
121. See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990).
122. See Lee v. Alleghany Reg. Hosp. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 900, 903 (W.D. Va. 1991)
(citing Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp 1302, 1305 (N.D. Ill. 1990)).
123. Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872,880 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal citation
omitted).




A decision not to provide aggressive treatment could very well be
deemed reasonable where no medical course of treatment, not even ag-
gressive measures, would improve the infant's or child's condition, lead to
any conscious brain activity, or significantly extend the infant's or child's
life. Additionally, nowhere in the statutory language of EMTALA itself
or in its legislative history is a physician required to provide medically
inappropriate treatment to patients in a hospital emergency department
in order to stabilize their condition. In fact, the legislative history specifi-
cally notes that EMTALA was not intended to interfere with a physi-
cian's medical judgment. 127 Senator Hatch chaired the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources when Congress passed the
EMTALA in 1985. Chairman Hatch conclusively noted in a description
of the EMTALA in the Senate Committee's report to Congress that
"[t]he bill ... does not interfere with the practice of medicine."'128
IV. WHO DECIDES AND HOW?
A. PARENTS As PRIMARY MEDICAL DECISION MAKERS
FOR CHILDREN
Seventy years ago, the Supreme Court established that parents have a
constitutionally protected right to "bring up children."'1 29 This right is
derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 130
Furthermore, parents have the "primary role" in the "upbringing of their
children. "131
The Supreme Court established that decisions for children can be
based on the parents' free exercise of religion and are protected by the
First Amendment. 32 Thus, for example, the state cannot compel a par-
ent to send her child to public school rather than parochial school. 133
127. Enforcement mechanisms such as criminal and financial penalties were discussed
in the context of assuring medically reasonable care in the emergency room:
The Judiciary Committee shares the concern of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee that appropriate emergency room care be provided to patients faced
with medical emergencies .... The Committee ... has recommended a
provision ... which would provide that a $25,000 fine may be imposed on a
physician, as well as a hospital, who fails to properly respond to the genuine
medical needs of individuals who come to emergency rooms.
H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. 3, 6, 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579,
726 (emphasis added).
Because of the difficulty in defining appropriate medical practice at a given time, Con-
gress deleted from the final text of EMTALA sanctions against physicians who fail to pro-
vide treatment to stabilize the patient, even if the failure represents a gross deviation from
the local standards of medical practice, or provide for treatment in a manner that is so
inappropriate as to represent a gross deviation from prevailing standards of local medical
practice. Id.
128. S. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 454 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
42, 413.
129. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
130. Id.; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
131. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); accord Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
132. Id.
133. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
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Similarly, the state cannot compel Amish parents, over their religious ob-
jections, to send their children to formal high school; this would be an
unconstitutional violation of the parents' rights under both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 34
Arguably, these constitutional principles extend to the right of parents
to make medical treatment decisions for their minor children. The
Supreme Court has established that, "absent a finding of neglect or
abuse .... [parents] retain plenary authority to seek such care for their
children."'1 35 It is also recognized that "the traditional presumption [is]
that parents act in the best interests of their child,"'1 36 reasoning that this
is due to the "natural bonds of affection [that the parents have for their
children]."'137 In nearly all cases parents can be trusted to seek out and
decide on medical treatment for their children.
In every instance, the patient's interests are paramount; however, the
presumption is that the family is the best source for determining and
protecting the patient's best interests. In the case of the pediatric
patient, the priorities for treatment should first be set by the parents
and then by other surrogates. The interests of infants or children are
necessarily embedded within the interest of the family. The unique
interdependence between the child and the family justifies the fam-
ily's participation in treatment related decisions. Within the family
unit, there is a strong presumption in favor of the parents as primary
decision-makers for their children. 138
B. CoNFLIcrING VIEWS DESERVE CONSIDERATION
Parents do not have an absolute right to make medical decisions for
their children.139 In fact, a state may under some circumstances override
parental judgment in order to protect the welfare of the child.' 40 This
being the case, the parents are not the only adults authorized by law to
express a view of an ill child's interests. Significantly, when a court ap-
points a guardian ad litem,141 the state recognizes the possibility that a
parent, however well-intended, may not be the best source for determin-
ing and protecting the child's best interests.' 42
134. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
135. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S 584, 604 (1979). The Court does note, however, that such
authority is "subject to a physician's independent examination and medical judgment." Id.
136. Id
137. Id at 602.
138. Task Force on Ethics of the Society of Critical Care in Medicine, Consensus Report
on the Ethics of Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatments in the Critically Ill, 18 CRITCAL
CARE MED. 1435," 1438 (1990) [hereinafter Report].
139. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584; Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); In re Cic-
ero, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
140. In re Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836, 843 (Mass. 1979).
141. See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d. 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994); Paris et
al., supra note 10 (appointing guardians ad litem).
142. Report, supra note 138, at 1438.
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C. MULTIPLE ROLES IN THE TREATMENT OF SEVERELY
ILL CHILDREN
When an infant or child is close to death, medical professionals should
provide the following assistance: First, they should help to educate the
family or other surrogates as decision-makers by explaining the infant's
condition, prognosis, and treatment options. A major portion of the pro-
fessional's usefulness to the family lies in her or his ability to place treat-
ment options in the context of achievable goals for the infant or child.
For example, the Society of Critical Care Medicine guidelines note that
"[a]ny treatment derives its medical justification from the benefits that
the informed patient [or parent] and the physician hope to achieve by
employing it. When the treatment has achieved those benefits, or can no
longer reasonably be expected to do so, the treatment loses its justifica-
tion and may be withdrawn."'1 43 Where a severely ill child is dying (spe-
cifically, a child in a persistent vegetative state or an anencephalic infant),
the health care team members should make every effort to assist the fam-
ily of such a patient to appreciate the medical futility of continued inten-
sive care unit treatment and to understand the rationale for transfer to
another level of care.1'"
Second, medical professionals should address misunderstandings and
disagreements about the patient's care-both among family members
and other surrogates and between families and caregivers. This commu-
nication function between the health care provider and the family is most
important, and there is certainly a need to explain the futility of certain
treatment options. When a patient or surrogate requests a treatment the
physician considers inappropriate, physicians are urged to help the surro-
gate reassess the goals of the therapy. 145 If caregivers and family disa-
gree, health providers are counseled to work with patients to arrive at a
"mutually satisfactory course of therapy."'146
Finally, medical professionals should treat the patient. Whatever treat-
ment is selected, by whatever process, these professionals are intimately
involved with the care of critically ill patients. Every effort should be
made to determine the wishes of the patient, including patients who are
children. 47 When patients are not able to express their wishes, family
143. Id. at 1435.
144. Id. at 1437.
145. Id. at 1438.
146. Id. The Child Abuse Amendments require the Department of Health and Human
Services to promulgate guidelines that encourage hospitals to establish infant care review
committees (ICRCs) to address the withholding of medically indicated treatment from dis-
abled infants and children with life-threatening conditions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). These ICRCs serve in an advisory capacity to the health care
provider by educating hospital personnel and families of disabled children with life-threat-
ening conditions, by recommending institutional policies and guidelines concerning the
withholding of medically indicated treatment from the infant or child, and by offering
counseling and review of cases involving conflicts between the parents and health care
providers. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340 (1985) for DHHS model guidelines and analysis.
147. Report, supra note 138, at 1438.
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members or other surrogates are to be consulted as to the wishes of the
patients or the patients' presumed interests.148 Most ethical guidelines
for health care providers exhibit a real concern for the needs of the fam-
ily. In particular, "providers are obligated to provide comfort and sup-
port to the patient's family throughout the entire process of decision-
making and thereafter."'1 49 The heart of the controversy is not whether to
treat the patient, but how. The decision to end, or not to begin, aggres-
sive medical treatment should never be confused with abandoning the
patient.'50
D. ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM FORCED TREATMENT
As is evident from the preceding discussion, health care providers
should first be counselors and do their utmost to bring parents and fami-
lies to an understanding of the sick child's medical status and treatment
possibilities. Second, they should cooperate as far as possible with pa-
tients' and families' preferences. Unfortunately, those goals cannot al-
ways be achieved. The regrettable eventuality is that the parent rejects
the explanations of medical providers as to the child's condition and ad-
visable mode of treatment, while at the same time the medical and ethical
conclusions of the providers prohibit them from acceding to the parent's
wishes.
Medical decision-making is a collaborative process in which the physi-
cian explains reasonable alternatives to the patients and often expresses a
preference among them. The patient decides whether to select that ther-
apy, another therapy named by the physician, or no therapy at all. The
patient may seek another physician but may not, within the boundaries of
medicine as it is normally practiced, force a physician to undertake treat-
ment that the physician does not think would benefit the patient.
151
The general principles noted above are relevant whether the patient is
an infant or an adult. Parents believe that they speak for the child, and
the law recognizes and validates that belief in almost all instances.'
5 2
Still, nothing can completely obviate the necessity for the physician to
exercise independent judgment if parents demand intervention that is
clearly unwarranted. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethi-
cal Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research ad-
dressed this difficult issue and concluded in relevant part: "Therapies
expected to be futile for a seriously ill newborn need not be provided;
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1439.
150. Id. at 1437.
151. Moreover, if a physician or hospital concludes that a parent's decision to withhold
treatment is unjustified, the provider may (or, in some cases, must) seek judicial interven-
tion. See, e.g., the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (requiring states to have procedures to take action where indicated medical
care is withheld).
152. See supra notes 129-138 and accompanying text.
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parents, health care professionals and institutions, and reimbursement
sources, however, should ensure the infant's comfort."'1 53
An article recently published in a leading medical journal reiterates
these principles:
If after the physician has listened to the concern of the family mem-
bers and explored the possibilities with them-including the transfer
of the patient to a willing physician-the family persists in its de-
mands for continued life-prolonging treatment that the physician be-
lieves to be beyond well established medical criteria, the physician
ought not feel obliged to provide it .... This is done not because the
patient no longer has any values or because the physician lacks re-
spect for the family's wishes. It is done because the obligation of
physicians, as articulated in the Hippocratic Oath, is to act for the
benefit of the patient according to their ability and judgment. 154
This passage serves to emphasize the ethical and moral dilemma that
faces doctors when making futility decisions. The dilemma goes to the
very heart of his profession.
The legal and political communities have also embraced the notion that
physicians cannot be forced to act against the best interests of their pa-
tients. Thus, for example, a Massachusetts court held that a hospital and
its staff "should not be compelled.., to withhold food and water contrary
to [their] moral and ethical principles, when such principles are recog-
nized and accepted within a significant segment of the medical profession
and the hospital community.' 5 5 Moreover, the President's Commission
Report stated that while "health care professionals or institutions may
decline to provide a particular option because that choice would violate
their conscience or professional judgment ... in doing so they may not
abandon a patient."'1 56
V. CONCLUSION
As for Baby K, the end result leads us only to contemplate the future
conflicts in this area, and anxiously to anticipate a response from society
through state legislatures and Congress. In Baby K, the district court
found for the mother, and held that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
ADA, and the EMTALA prohibited the hospital from denying treatment
to Baby K.157 Furthermore, the court held that the presumption under
both common law and constitutional law is that Ms. H was the appropri-
ate decision-maker for Baby K.158 Therefore, the court concluded that
153. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 6 (1983).
154. John J. Paris et al., Beyond Autonomy-Physician's Refusal to Use Life-Prolong-
ing Extra-Corporeal Membrane Oxygenation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 354, 357 (1993).
155. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp. Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (1986).
156. Paris et al., supra note 154, at 356.
157. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
158. Id. at 1030.
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absent a finding of neglect or abuse, parents retain plenary authority to
seek medical care for their children.' 5 9 The court's sweeping ruling man-
dated the hospital to continue to provide treatment to Baby K.
The issues arose again on appeal to the Fourth Circuit, which was asked
to decide whether the district court had drastically misinterpreted Con-
gress' intent under the federal statutes. However, the appellate court of-
fered little help, since it held for the mother based solely on the
EMTALA and declined even to discuss the other statutes. 160 While the
EMTALA is certainly the most difficult argument to make in favor of the
doctors and hospital, the holding of the court leaves us with an answer for
only a very narrow situation. It does not answer the broader question of
whether physicians can be forced, in situations that do not implicate the
EMTALA, to administer treatment that is deemed medically inappropri-
ate and futile. It also sheds no light on how these types of decisions con-
cerning futility will be dealt with in the future and where the physician's
autonomy fits in with the right of parents to make decisions regarding the
health care of their children.
Such is the case whereby prevailing standards of medical ethics accord
patients the right to accept or reject the treatment recommended by their
physicians. In the case of children, this right generally may be exercised
by their parents, whom the law rightly presumes to be acting in the child's
best interests. This presumption, however, must be balanced with the in-
terest of the doctors and hospital administering the care. Medical ethics
do not permit patients to require a physician to render treatment that, in
the physician's judgment, would be futile or otherwise medically inappro-
priate. It is ethical for a physician to refuse to accede to such a demand-
be it from a patient on his own behalf or from a parent on behalf of a
child. This may even be true if the parent would derive psychological
comfort from the futile treatment, where the treatment is determined to
be futile according to the prevailing standard of care within the medical
profession. In other words, the treatment is not simply one doctor's sub-
jective opinion, but a consensus of medical opinions and diagnoses
throughout the profession. Accordingly, where a patient insists on treat-
ment that the physician or hospital considers medically inappropriate and
futile, an impasse is created. The patient can of course go elsewhere to
seek such treatment. If this is not an option, then the process of redefin-
ing the goals of continued care by the parents needs to be started, and a
real effort by both the parents and the physicians and hospital should be
made.161 If it is necessary to continue the treatment while this period of
reevaluation is occurring, then that is a necessary cost. In the long run,
however, a parent acting on behalf of the child cannot force a physician
to act against his or her own medical judgment.
159. Id.
160. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 590.
161. Thomas Win. Mayo, The Medical Futility Police: Head 'em Off at the Impasse, 9
HEALTH CARE L. & ETHics 23, 26-27 (1994).
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A variety of federal statutes are seemingly implicated by these strug-
gles between physician and parent, although none of them were ever in-
tended to interfere with a physician's medical judgment or ethical
responsibilities. Rather, these statutes principally guarantee the disabled
access to an array of social benefits, including medical care. Nothing in
the statutes, nor in their legislative history, suggests that Congress in-
tended to suspend any physician's ability-and obligation-to form in-
dependent medical judgments and to act on them. Thus, medical
decision-making should be primarily left to the states and adjudged ac-
cording to the prevailing standard of care. In the alternative, a federal
statute that directly addresses the issue of futility and the implications
thereof should be promulgated or amendments made to the federal stat-
utes so that courts will have a clearer directive in this very difficult area of
decision-making.
